

# Gloucester City Council

|                  |   |                          |               |
|------------------|---|--------------------------|---------------|
| Meeting:         | Audit & Governance Committee  | Date:                    | 16 March 2015 |
|                  | Council   |                          | 18 March 2015 |
| Subject:         | Treasury Management Strategy 2015/16  |                          |               |
| Report Of:       | Cabinet Member for Performance and Resources  |                          |               |
| Wards Affected:  | All   |                          |               |
| Key Decision:    | No  | Budget/Policy Framework: | Yes           |
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| Appendices:      | 1. Treasury Management Strategy 2015/16   |                          |               |

## 1.0 Purpose of Report

- 1.1 To formally recommend that full Council approves the attached Treasury Management Strategy, the prudential indicators and note the Treasury activities.

## 2.0 Recommendations

- 2.1 Audit and Governance Committee is asked to **RECOMMEND** that the Treasury Management Strategy be approved.
- 2.2 Council is asked to **RESOLVE** that:
- (1) The Treasury Management Strategy at Appendix 1 be approved;
  - (2) The authorised borrowing limit be approved at:-
    - a) 2015/16 £45m
    - b) 2016/17 £35m
    - c) 2017/18 £35m
  - (3) The prudential indicators set on in section two of the strategy be approved.
  - (4) Authority is delegated to s151 Officer in consultation with the Cabinet Member for Performance and Resources to make decisions on Treasury Management from 17<sup>th</sup> March 2015 to the 1<sup>st</sup> April 2015 outside of the 14/15 Treasury Strategy as a result of the stock transfer.

### **3.0 Background and Key Issues**

- 3.1 2015-16 is the first year for the Treasury Management Strategy since the transfer of Housing Stock to Gloucester City Homes. The stock transfer changes the financial landscape of the Council. However uncertainty in the market around debt premia means not all market debt relating to the stock transfer may be paid off immediately. The Treasury Management Strategy for 2015/16 factors in the uncertainty within the market for debt premia and as a result the Council will move to an over-borrowing position. The Council's level of external debt is forecast to exceed the capital financing requirement until certainty returns to the markets for debt premia at which point the Council will reschedule market debt relating to the stock transfer.
- 3.2 The Council is moving from an under to an over borrowed position. This means that the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement), has been fully funded with loan debt, and additional funds will be reinvested reducing the gap between cost of loans and interest received. This strategy is sensible as existing debt premia is high, yet forecast to reduce in future years. It is the intention of this strategy that debt will be rescheduled at the most opportune time and return the Council to an under borrowed position.
- 3.3 Stock transfer funds will be invested and short term cashflow balances will be invested for short periods within the year. Section 4 of the strategy outlines the Annual Investment Strategy; in particular it outlines the creditworthiness policy through the use of credit ratings.
- 3.4 The borrowing strategy is to utilise existing market debts in the short term while market uncertainty has adverse affects on debt premia, use investments to reduce the cost gap and repay long term debt as it becomes repayable. It is anticipated that any new debt will be short term as the current market rates are attractive and this also maximises future flexibility.
- 3.5 The strategy allows for either debt rescheduling or new long term fixed rate borrowing in place of short term borrowing if circumstances were to change during 2015/16.
- 3.6 The strategy also includes the minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy statement. This policy continues with the practice approved last year. MRP is the revenue charge to reduce debt and is only required by the General Fund. This option provides for a reduction in the borrowing need over the approximate asset life. For clarity the options for reduction are explained and can either be through an annuity calculation (providing a consistent overall annual borrowing charge) or straight line (where the principal repayment is the same each year).

### **4.0 Alternative Options Considered**

- 4.1 The following option has been considered:

The potential to repay market debts related to stock transfer immediately and borrow short term rather than long term. Present interest rates show short terms

rates are only 0.35% whereas long term rates are over 2.5% (10 years plus). This remains an option should debt premia conditions improve.

## **5.0 Reasons for Recommendations**

- 5.1 As outlined in the legal implications the recommendations require Council approval.

## **6.0 Future Work and Conclusions**

- 6.1 The Treasury Management Strategy provides a logical basis to fund the Council's capital financing requirement. The main issue that will impact on the strategy is market uncertainty around debt premia meaning market debt associated to the stock transfer will not be paid off immediately.

## **7.0 Financial Implications**

- 7.1 The expenditure and income arising from treasury management activities are included within the Council General Fund budget.

(Financial Services have been consulted in the preparation this report.)

## **8.0 Legal Implications**

- 8.1 The Council is required to have a Treasury Management Strategy is required to meet the requirements of the Local Government Act 2003, the CIPFA Prudential Code, CLG MRP Guidance, the CIPFA Treasury Management Code and CLG Investment Guidance.

(Legal Services have been consulted in the preparation this report.)

## **9.0 Risk & Opportunity Management Implications**

- 9.1 There is a risk that short term and long term interest rates could increase and this will be monitored both in-house and by the Council Treasury Management Advisor, Capita Asset Services. In this event the risk will be managed through the opportunities either to reschedule debt or new long term fixed rate borrowing in place of short term borrowing.
- 9.2 The risk of deposits not being returned by the counterparty is minimised by only investing short term cash flow monies with counterparties on the approved lending list. All counterparties on this list meet minimum credit rating criteria, ensuring the risk is kept extremely low although not eliminated.

## **10.0 People Impact Assessment (PIA):**

- 10.1 A PIA screening assessment has been undertaken and the impact is neutral. A full PIA is not required.

## **11.0 Other Corporate Implications**

Community Safety

11.1 None

Sustainability

11.2 None

Staffing & Trade Union

11.3 None

**Background Documents:**

Local Government Act 2003  
CIPFA Treasury Management Code  
CIPFA Prudential Code  
CLG MRP Guidance

## Appendix 1: Treasury Management Strategy 2015/16

### 1. INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 Background

The Council is required to operate a balanced budget, which broadly means that cash raised during the year will meet cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the Council's low risk appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering investment return.

The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer term cash flow planning to ensure that the Council can meet its capital spending obligations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using longer term cash flow surpluses. On occasion any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.

CIPFA defines treasury management as:

*"The management of the local authority's investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks."*

#### 1.2 Reporting requirements

The Council is required to receive and approve, as a minimum, three main reports each year, which incorporate a variety of policies, estimates and actuals.

**Prudential and Treasury Indicators and Treasury Strategy** (this report) - The first, and most important report covers:

- the capital plans (including prudential indicators);
- a minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy (how residual capital expenditure is charged to revenue over time);
- the treasury management strategy (how the investments and borrowings are to be organised) including treasury indicators; and
- an investment strategy (the parameters on how investments are to be managed).

**Quarterly Treasury update reports** – This will update members with the progress of the capital position, amending prudential indicators as necessary, and whether any policies require revision

**An annual treasury report** – This provides details of a selection of actual prudential and treasury indicators and actual treasury operations compared to the estimates within the strategy.

## **Scrutiny**

The above reports are required to be adequately scrutinised before being recommended to the Council. This role is undertaken by the Audit and Governance Committee.

### **1.3 Treasury Management Strategy for 2015/16**

The strategy for 2015/16 covers two main areas:

#### **Capital issues**

- the capital plans and the prudential indicators;
- the minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy.

#### **Treasury management issues**

- the current treasury position;
- treasury indicators which limit the treasury risk and activities of the Council;
- prospects for interest rates;
- the borrowing strategy;
- policy on borrowing in advance of need;
- debt rescheduling;
- the investment strategy;
- creditworthiness policy; and
- policy on use of external service providers.

These elements cover the requirements of the Local Government Act 2003, the CIPFA Prudential Code, CLG MRP Guidance, the CIPFA Treasury Management Code and CLG Investment Guidance.

### **1.4 Training**

The CIPFA Code requires the responsible officer to ensure that members with responsibility for treasury management receive adequate training in treasury management. This especially applies to members responsible for scrutiny. Training for Members was provided in 2014/15, further training will be arranged as required during 15/16. The training needs of treasury management officers are periodically reviewed.

### **1.5 Treasury management consultants**

The Council uses Capita Asset Services, Treasury solutions as its external treasury management advisors.

The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon our external service providers.

It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The Council will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

## **2. THE CAPITAL PRUDENTIAL INDICATORS 2015/16 – 2017/18**

The Council's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The output of the capital expenditure plans is reflected in the prudential indicators, which are designed to assist members' overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

### **2.1 Capital expenditure**

This prudential indicator is a summary of the Council's capital expenditure plans, both those agreed previously, and those forming part of this budget cycle. Members are asked to approve the capital expenditure forecasts:

| <b>Capital expenditure<br/>£m</b> | <b>2013/14<br/>Actual</b> | <b>2014/15<br/>Estimate</b> | <b>2015/16<br/>Estimate</b> | <b>2016/17<br/>Estimate</b> | <b>2017/18<br/>Estimate</b> |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Regeneration                      | 2.266                     | 8.021                       | 2.257                       | 7.130                       | 0.900                       |
| Services &<br>Neighbourhood       | 0.864                     | 0.518                       | 1.152                       | 0.683                       | 0.627                       |
| Resources                         | 0.423                     | 0.141                       | 1.050                       | 0.500                       | 0.200                       |
| Housing GF                        | 0.734                     | 0.750                       | 0.715                       | 0.715                       | 0.539                       |
| <b>Total Non-HRA</b>              | <b>4.239</b>              | <b>9.430</b>                | <b>5.174</b>                | <b>9.028</b>                | <b>2.266</b>                |
|                                   |                           |                             |                             |                             |                             |
| <b>HRA</b>                        | <b>6.050</b>              | <b>7.109</b>                | <b>0</b>                    | <b>0</b>                    | <b>0</b>                    |
|                                   |                           |                             |                             |                             |                             |
| <b>Total</b>                      | <b>10.337</b>             | <b>16.539</b>               | <b>5.174</b>                | <b>9.028</b>                | <b>2.266</b>                |

The Council has other long term liabilities which relate to the difference between the Local Government Pension Liabilities and Assets. These do not have any treasury impact on Gloucester City Council as the Pension Fund is managed by Gloucestershire County Council. Therefore, other long term liabilities have been excluded from this strategy.

The table below summarises the above capital expenditure plans and how these plans are being financed by capital or revenue resources. Any shortfall of resources results in a funding borrowing need.

| <b>Capital expenditure<br/>£m</b>          | <b>2013/14<br/>Actual</b> | <b>2014/15<br/>Estimate</b> | <b>2015/16<br/>Estimate</b> | <b>2016/17<br/>Estimate</b> | <b>2017/18<br/>Estimate</b> |
|--|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Total                                      | 10.377                    | 16.539                      | 5.174                       | 9.028                       | 2.266                       |
| <b>Financed by:</b>                        |                           |                             |                             |                             |                             |
| Capital receipts                           | 2.774                     | 1.196                       | 2.730                       | 0.552                       | 0.385                       |
| Capital grants                             | 0.824                     | 0.806                       | 2.234                       | 8.041                       | 1.881                       |
| HRA Major repairs                          | 2.100                     | 2.100                       | 0                           | 0                           | 0                           |
| HRA Revenue                                | 0                         | 5.009                       | 0                           | 0                           | 0                           |
| <b>Net financing need<br/>for the year</b> | <b>4.639</b>              | <b>7.428</b>                | <b>0.210</b>                | <b>0.435</b>                | <b>0</b>                    |

## 2.2 The Council's borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement)

The second prudential indicator is the Council's Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). The CFR is simply the total historic outstanding capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for from either revenue or capital resources. It is essentially a measure of the Council's underlying borrowing need. Any capital expenditure above, which has not immediately been paid for, will increase the CFR.

The CFR does not increase indefinitely, as the minimum revenue provision (MRP) is a statutory annual revenue charge which broadly reduces the borrowing need in line with each assets life.

The Council is asked to approve the CFR projections below:

| <b>£m</b>                            | <b>2013/14<br/>Actual</b> | <b>2014/15<br/>Estimate</b> | <b>2015/16<br/>Estimate</b> | <b>2016/17<br/>Estimate</b> | <b>2017/18<br/>Estimate</b> |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| <b>Capital Financing Requirement</b> |                           |                             |                             |                             |                             |
| <b>Total CFR</b>                     | <b>80.876</b>             | <b>24.010</b>               | <b>23.565</b>               | <b>23.291</b>               | <b>22.577</b>               |
| <b>Movement in CFR</b>               | <b>4.174</b>              | <b>(56.866)</b>             | <b>(0.445)</b>              | <b>(0.274)</b>              | <b>(0.714)</b>              |

| <b>Movement in CFR represented by</b>      |              |                 |                |                |                |
|--|--------------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Net financing need for the year (above)    | 4.639        | 7.428           | 0.211          | 0.435          | 0              |
| Less MRP/VRP and other financing movements | (464)        | (1.544)         | (0.656)        | (0.709)        | (0.714)        |
| Housing Stock Transfer                     | 0            | (62.75)         | 0              | 0              | 0              |
| <b>Movement in CFR</b>                     | <b>4.174</b> | <b>(56.866)</b> | <b>(0.445)</b> | <b>(0.274)</b> | <b>(0.714)</b> |



## 2.3 Minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy statement

The Council is required to pay off an element of the accumulated General Fund capital spend each year (the CFR) through a revenue charge (the minimum revenue provision - MRP), although it is also allowed to undertake additional voluntary payments if required (voluntary revenue provision - VRP).

CLG regulations have been issued which require the full Council to approve **an MRP Statement** in advance of each year. A variety of options are provided to councils, so long as there is a prudent provision.

For capital expenditure incurred before 1 April 2008 or which in the future will be Supported Capital Expenditure, the MRP policy will be:

- **Existing practice** - MRP will follow the existing practice outlined in former CLG regulations (option 1); this option provides for an approximate 4% reduction in the borrowing need (CFR) each year.

From 1 April 2008 for all unsupported borrowing (including PFI and finance leases) the MRP policy will be:

- **Asset life method** – MRP will be based on the estimated life of the assets, in accordance with the regulations (this option must be applied for any expenditure capitalised under a Capitalisation Direction) (option 3); This option provide for a reduction in the borrowing need over approximately the asset's life.

## 2.4 Affordability prudential indicators

The previous sections cover the overall capital and control of borrowing prudential indicators, but within this framework prudential indicators are required to assess the affordability of the capital investment plans. These provide an indication of the impact of the capital investment plans on the Council's overall finances. The Council is asked to approve the following indicators:

## 2.5 Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream

This indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital (borrowing and other long term obligation costs net of investment income) against the net revenue stream.

| %     | 2013/14<br>Actual | 2014/15<br>Estimate | 2015/16<br>Estimate | 2016/17<br>Estimate | 2017/18<br>Estimate |
|-------|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Ratio | 4.56%             | 4.31%               | 7.16%               | 7.36%               | 7.52%               |

The estimates of financing costs include current commitments and the proposals in this budget report.

There is an increase in this indicator from 2015/16 onwards which is due to two primary factors. Firstly, the uncertainty in the market around debt premia

mean that not all of the market debt relating to the stock transfer may be paid off immediately. This will create a cost as the stock transfer funds will be reinvested at a lower rate of return than the cost of the market debt. Secondly, the Council has taken on additional borrowing to pay for asset purchases as part of the Kings Quarter Development.

## **2.6 Incremental impact of capital investment decisions on Council Tax**

This indicator identifies the revenue costs associated with proposed changes to the three year capital programme recommended in this budget report compared to the Council's existing approved commitments and current plans. The assumptions are based on the budget, but will invariably include some estimates, such as the level of Government support, which are not published over a three year period.

### **Incremental impact of capital investment decisions on the band D Council Tax**

| <b>£</b>                        | <b>2013/14<br/>Actual</b> | <b>2014/15<br/>Estimate</b> | <b>2015/16<br/>Estimate</b> | <b>2016/17<br/>Estimate</b> | <b>2017/18<br/>Estimate</b> |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| <b>Council Tax -<br/>Band D</b> | 0.85                      | -0.86                       | 11.92                       | 1.26                        | -0.11                       |

### 3. BORROWING

The capital expenditure plans set out in Section 2 provide details of the service activity of the Council. The treasury management function ensures that the Council's cash is organised in accordance with the the relevant professional codes, so that sufficient cash is available to meet this service activity. This will involve both the organisation of the cash flow and, where capital plans require, the organisation of appropriate borrowing facilities. The strategy covers the relevant treasury / prudential indicators, the current and projected debt positions and the annual investment strategy.

#### 3.1 Current portfolio position

The Council's treasury portfolio position at 31 March 2014, with forward projections are summarised below. The table shows the actual external debt (the treasury management operations), against the underlying capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement - CFR), highlighting any over or under borrowing.

| £m                                       | 2013/14<br>Actual | 2014/15<br>Estimate | 2015/16<br>Estimate | 2016/17<br>Estimate | 2017/18<br>Estimate |
|--|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| <b>External Debt</b>                     |                   |                     |                     |                     |                     |
| Debt at 1 April                          | 76.932            | 71.142              | 41.500              | 30.000              | 20.000              |
| Expected change in Debt                  | (5.790)           | (29.642)            | (11.500)            | (10.000)            | 0                   |
| Other long-term liabilities (OLTL)       | 0                 | 0                   | 0                   | 0                   | 0                   |
| Expected change in OLTL                  | 0                 | 0                   | 0                   | 0                   | 0                   |
| <b>Actual gross debt at 31 March</b>     | <b>71.142</b>     | <b>41.500</b>       | <b>30.000</b>       | <b>20.000</b>       | <b>20.000</b>       |
| <b>The Capital Financing Requirement</b> | <b>80.875</b>     | <b>24.010</b>       | <b>23.565</b>       | <b>23.291</b>       | <b>22.577</b>       |
| <b>Under / (over) borrowing</b>          | <b>9.733</b>      | <b>(17.490)</b>     | <b>(6.435)</b>      | <b>3.291</b>        | <b>2.577</b>        |

At the 31st March 2014 there was an under borrowing of £9.733m compared with the capital financing requirement. The 14/15 estimate is an over borrowed position due to uncertainty in the market around debt premia. The debt structure includes market loans with premia associated to current market conditions. Current uncertainty means that not all of the market debt relating to the stock transfer may be paid off immediately, it will be invested in the short term while the position is reviewed to ensure the Council maximises its return from the stock transfer. While the Council holds market loans associated with the stock transfer, the gross debt will exceed the capital financing requirement.

The Head of Finance reports that the Council will at the most opportune moment pay off market debts and return the Council to an under borrowed position. This view takes into account current commitments, existing plans, and the proposals in this budget report.

### 3.2 Treasury Indicators: limits to borrowing activity

**The operational boundary.** This is the limit beyond which external debt is not normally expected to exceed. In most cases, this would be a similar figure to the CFR, but may be lower or higher depending on the levels of actual debt.

| Operational boundary<br>£m     | 2014/15<br>Estimate | 2015/16<br>Estimate | 2016/17<br>Estimate | 2017/18<br>Estimate |
|--------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Debt                           | 45                  | 30                  | 30                  | 30                  |
| Other long term<br>liabilities | 0                   | 0                   | 0                   | 0                   |
| Total                          | 45                  | 30                  | 30                  | 30                  |

**The authorised limit for external debt.** A further key prudential indicator represents a control on the maximum level of borrowing. This represents a limit beyond which external debt is prohibited, and this limit needs to be set or revised by the full Council. It reflects the level of external debt which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term.

1. This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003. The Government retains an option to control either the total of all councils' plans, or those of a specific council, although this power has not yet been exercised.
2. The Council is asked to approve the following authorised limit:

| Authorised limit £m            | 2014/15<br>Estimate | 2015/16<br>Estimate | 2016/17<br>Estimate | 2017/18<br>Estimate |
|--------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Debt                           | 45                  | 35                  | 35                  | 35                  |
| Other long term<br>liabilities | 0                   | 0                   | 0                   | 0                   |
| Total                          | 45                  | 35                  | 35                  | 35                  |

### 3.3 Prospects for interest rates

The Council has appointed Capita Asset Services as its treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. The following table gives our central view:

| Annual Average % | Bank Rate % | PWLB Borrowing Rates %<br>(including certainty rate adjustment) |         |         |
|------------------|-------------|---|---------|---------|
|                  |             | 5 year  | 25 year | 50 year |
| Mar 2015         | 0.50        | 2.20  | 3.40    | 3.40    |
| Jun 2015         | 0.50        | 2.20  | 3.50    | 3.50    |
| Sep 2015         | 0.50        | 2.30  | 3.70    | 3.70    |
| Dec 2015         | 0.75        | 2.50  | 3.80    | 3.80    |
| Mar 2016         | 0.75        | 2.60  | 4.00    | 4.00    |
| Jun 2016         | 1.00        | 2.80  | 4.20    | 4.20    |
| Sep 2016         | 1.00        | 2.90  | 4.30    | 4.30    |
| Dec 2016         | 1.25        | 3.00  | 4.40    | 4.40    |
| Mar 2017         | 1.25        | 3.20  | 4.50    | 4.50    |
| Jun 2017         | 1.50        | 3.30  | 4.60    | 4.60    |
| Sep 2017         | 1.75        | 3.40  | 4.70    | 4.70    |
| Dec 2017         | 1.75        | 3.50  | 4.70    | 4.70    |
| Mar 2018         | 2.00        | 3.60  | 4.80    | 4.80    |

UK GDP growth surged during 2013 and the first half of 2014. During the second half of 2014, it has cooled somewhat but still remained strong by UK standards. Growth is likely to strengthen marginally in 2015 and 2016 under the stimulative effect of the fall in oil prices. There still needs to be a significant rebalancing of the economy away from consumer spending to manufacturing, business investment and exporting in order for this recovery to become more firmly established. One drag on the economy has been that wage inflation had only recently started to exceed CPI inflation, so enabling disposable income and living standards to start improving. The plunge in the price of oil brought CPI inflation down to a low of 0.5% in December, the lowest rate since May 2000 and it could even turn negative in the first half of 2015; this will further increase consumer disposable income and so underpin economic growth during 2015. However, labour productivity needs to improve substantially to enable wage rates to increase and further support consumer disposable income and economic growth. In addition, the encouraging rate at which unemployment has been falling must eventually feed through into pressure for wage increases, though current views on the amount of hidden slack in the labour market probably means that this is unlikely to happen early in 2015.

The US, the biggest world economy, has generated stunning growth rates of 4.6% (annualised) in Q2 2014 and 5.0% in Q3, followed by a cooler 2.6% in Q4 (overall 2.4% for 2014 as a whole). This is hugely promising for the outlook for strong growth going forwards and it very much looks as if the US is now firmly on the path of full recovery from the financial crisis of 2008. Consequently, it is now confidently expected that the US will be the first major western economy to start on central rate increases by the end of 2015.

The current economic outlook and structure of market interest rates and government debt yields have several key treasury management implications:

- Greece: the general election on 25 January 2015 brought to power a coalition which is strongly anti EU imposed austerity. However, if this should eventually result in Greece leaving the Euro, it is unlikely that this will directly destabilise the Eurozone as the EU has put in place adequate firewalls to contain the immediate fallout to just Greece. However, the indirect effects of the likely strengthening of anti EU and anti austerity political parties throughout the EU is much more difficult to gauge;
- As for the Eurozone in general, concerns in respect of a major crisis subsided considerably in 2013. However, the downturn in growth and inflation during the second half of 2014, and worries over the Ukraine situation and the Middle East, have led to a resurgence of those concerns as risks increase that it could be heading into a prolonged period of deflation and very weak growth. Sovereign debt difficulties have not gone away and major concerns could return in respect of individual countries that do not dynamically address fundamental issues of low growth, international uncompetitiveness and the need for overdue reforms of the economy (as Ireland has done). It is, therefore, possible over the next few years that levels of government debt to GDP ratios could continue to rise to levels that could result in a loss of investor confidence in the financial viability of such countries. Counterparty risks therefore remain elevated. This continues to suggest the use of higher quality counterparties for shorter time periods;
- Investment returns are likely to remain relatively low during 2015/16 and beyond;
- Borrowing interest rates have been highly volatile during 2014 and early 2015 as alternating bouts of good and bad news have promoted optimism, and then pessimism, in financial markets. The opening weeks of 2015 saw gilt yields dip to historically phenomenally low levels after inflation plunged, a flight to quality as a result of the Greek situation and the start of a huge programme of quantitative easing (purchase of EZ government debt), by the ECB in January 2015. The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances has served well over the last few years. However, this needs to be carefully reviewed to avoid incurring higher borrowing costs in later times, when authorities will not be able to avoid new borrowing to finance new capital expenditure and/or to refinance maturing debt;

- There will remain a cost of carry to any new borrowing which causes an increase in investments as this will incur a revenue loss between borrowing costs and investment returns.

### 3.4 Borrowing strategy

The Council is moving from an under to an over borrowed position. This means that the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement), has been fully funded with loan debt, additional funds will be reinvested reducing the gap between cost of loans and interest received. This strategy is prudent as existing debt premia is high, yet forecast to reduce in future years.

Against this background and the risks within the economic forecast, caution will be adopted with the 2015/16 treasury operations. The Head of Finance will monitor interest rates in financial markets and adopt a pragmatic approach to changing circumstances:

- *if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a sharp FALL in long and short term rates* (e.g. due to a marked increase of risks around relapse into recession or of risks of deflation), then long term borrowings will be postponed, and potential rescheduling from fixed rate funding into short term borrowing will be considered subject to debt premia.
- *if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a much sharper RISE in long and short term rates than that currently forecast*, perhaps arising from a greater than expected increase in the anticipated rate to US tapering of asset purchases, or in world economic activity or a sudden increase in inflation risks, then the portfolio position will be re-appraised with the likely action that fixed rate funding will be drawn whilst interest rates are still lower than they will be in the next few years.

Any decisions will be reported to the appropriate decision making body at the next available opportunity.

### 3.5 Treasury management limits on activity

There are three debt related treasury activity limits. The purpose of these are to restrain the activity of the treasury function within certain limits, thereby managing risk and reducing the impact of any adverse movement in interest rates. However, if these are set to be too restrictive they will impair the opportunities to reduce costs/ improve performance. The indicators are:

- Upper limits on variable interest rate exposure. This identifies a maximum limit for variable interest rates based upon the debt position net of investments
- Upper limits on fixed interest rate exposure. This is similar to the previous indicator and covers a maximum limit on fixed interest rates;
- Maturity structure of borrowing. These gross limits are set to reduce the Council's exposure to large fixed rate sums falling due for refinancing, and are required for upper and lower limits.

The Council is asked to approve the following treasury indicators and limits:

| £m   | 2015/16 | 2016/17 | 2017/18 |
|--|---------|---------|---------|
| Interest rate exposures  |         |         |         |
|  | Upper   | Upper   | Upper   |
| Limits on fixed interest rates based on net debt               | 100%    | 100%    | 100%    |
| Limits on variable interest rates based on net debt            | 100%    | 100%    | 100%    |
| Maturity structure of fixed interest rate borrowing 2015/16    |         |         |         |
|  | Lower   | Upper   |         |
| Under 12 months  | 0%      | 50%     |         |
| 12 months to 2 years   | 0%      | 50%     |         |
| 2 years to 5 years   | 0%      | 50%     |         |
| 5 years to 10 years  | 0%      | 80%     |         |
| 10 years and above   | 0%      | 80%     |         |
| Maturity structure of variable interest rate borrowing 2015/16 |         |         |         |
|  | Lower   | Upper   |         |
| Under 12 months  | 0%      | 100%    |         |
| 12 months to 2 years   | 0%      | 100%    |         |
| 2 years to 5 years   | 0%      | 100%    |         |
| 5 years to 10 years  | 0%      | 80%     |         |
| 10 years and above   | 0%      | 50%     |         |

### 3.6 Policy on borrowing in advance of need

The Council will not borrow more than or in advance of its needs purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates, and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the Council can ensure the security of such funds. The Council will be in an over borrowed position in the short term, the intended policy is to return the Council to an under borrowed position at the earliest opportunity.

Risks associated with any borrowing in advance activity will be subject to prior appraisal and subsequent reporting through the mid-year or annual reporting mechanism.

### 3.7 Debt rescheduling

As short term borrowing rates will be considerably cheaper than longer term fixed interest rates, there may be potential opportunities to generate savings by switching from long term debt to short term debt. However, these savings will need to be considered in the light of the current treasury position and the size of the cost of debt repayment (premiums incurred).

The reasons for any rescheduling to take place will include:

- the generation of cash savings and / or discounted cash flow savings;
- helping to fulfil the treasury strategy;



- enhance the balance of the portfolio (amend the maturity profile and/or the balance of volatility).

Consideration will also be given to identify if there is any residual potential for making savings by running down investment balances to repay debt prematurely as short term rates on investments are likely to be lower than rates paid on current debt.

All rescheduling will be reported to the Cabinet, at the earliest meeting following its action.

### **3.8 Municipal Bond Agency**

It is likely that the Municipal Bond Agency, currently in the process of being set up, will be offering loans to local authorities in the near future. It is also hoped that the borrowing rates will be lower than those offered by the Public Works Loan Board (PWLb). This Authority intends to make use of this new source of borrowing as and when appropriate.

## **4. ANNUAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY**

### **4.1 Introduction: changes to credit rating methodology**

The main rating agencies (Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poor's) have, through much of the financial crisis, provided some institutions with a ratings "uplift" due to implied levels of sovereign support. More recently, in response to the evolving regulatory regime, the agencies have indicated they may remove these "uplifts". This process may commence during 2014/15 and / or 2015/16. The actual timing of the changes is still subject to discussion, but this does mean immediate changes to the credit methodology are required.

It is important to stress that the rating agency changes do not reflect any changes in the underlying status of the institution or credit environment, merely the implied level of sovereign support that has been built into ratings through the financial crisis. The eventual removal of implied sovereign support will only take place when the regulatory and economic environments have ensured that financial institutions are much stronger and less prone to failure in a financial crisis.

Both Fitch and Moody's provide "standalone" credit ratings for financial institutions. For Fitch, it is the Viability Rating, while Moody's has the Financial Strength Rating. Due to the future removal of sovereign support from institution assessments, both agencies have suggested going forward that these will be in line with their respective Long Term ratings. As such, there is no point monitoring both Long Term and these "standalone" ratings.

Furthermore, Fitch has already begun assessing its Support ratings, with a clear expectation that these will be lowered to 5, which is defined as "A bank for which there is a possibility of external support, but it cannot be relied upon." With all institutions likely to drop to these levels, there is little to no differentiation to be had by assessing Support ratings.

As a result of these rating agency changes, the credit element of our future methodology will focus solely on the Short and Long Term ratings of an institution. Rating Watch and Outlook information will continue to be assessed where it relates to these categories. This is the same process for Standard & Poor's that we have always taken, but a change to the use of Fitch and Moody's ratings. Furthermore, we will continue to utilise CDS prices as an overlay to ratings in our new methodology.

### **4.2 Investment policy**

The Council's investment policy has regard to the CLG's Guidance on Local Government Investments ("the Guidance") and the revised CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes ("the CIPFA TM Code"). The Council's investment priorities will be security first, liquidity second, then return.

In accordance with the above guidance from the CLG and CIPFA, and in order to minimise the risk to investments, the Council applies minimum acceptable credit criteria in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties which also enables diversification and thus avoidance of concentration risk.

Continuing regulatory changes in the banking sector are designed to see greater stability, lower risk and the removal of expectations of Government financial support should an institution fail. This withdrawal of implied sovereign support is anticipated to have an effect on ratings applied to institutions. This will result in the key ratings used to monitor counterparties being the Short Term and Long Term ratings only. Viability, Financial Strength and Support Ratings previously applied will effectively become redundant. This change does not reflect deterioration in the credit environment but rather a change of method in response to regulatory changes.

As with previous practice, ratings will not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution and that it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To this end the Council will engage with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as “credit default swaps” and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings.

Other information sources used will include the financial press, share price and other such information pertaining to the banking sector in order to establish the most robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.

Investment instruments identified for use in the financial year are listed in appendix 5.3 under the ‘specified’ and ‘non-specified’ investments categories. Counterparty limits will be as set through the Council’s treasury management practices – schedules.

#### **4.3 Creditworthiness policy**

This Council applies the creditworthiness service provided by Capita Asset Services. This service employs a sophisticated modelling approach utilising credit ratings from the three main credit rating agencies - Fitch, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s. The credit ratings of counterparties are supplemented with the following overlays:

- credit watches and credit outlooks from credit rating agencies;
- CDS spreads to give early warning of likely changes in credit ratings;
- sovereign ratings to select counterparties from only the most creditworthy countries.

This modelling approach combines credit ratings, credit watches and credit outlooks in a weighted scoring system which is then combined with an overlay of CDS spreads for which the end product is a series of colour coded bands which indicate the relative creditworthiness of counterparties. These colour codes are used by the Council to determine the suggested duration for investments. The Council will therefore use counterparties within the following durational bands:

- Yellow 5 years \*
- Dark pink 5 years for Enhanced money market funds (EMMFs) with a credit score of 1.25
- Light pink 5 years for Enhanced money market funds (EMMFs) with a credit score of 1.5
- Purple 2 years
- Blue 1 year (only applies to nationalised or semi nationalised UK Banks)
- Orange 1 year
- Red 6 months
- Green 100 days
- No colour not to be used

|   | Colour (and long term rating where applicable) | Money and/or % Limit | Time Limit |
|---|--|----------------------|------------|
| Banks   | yellow   | £5m                  | 5yrs       |
| Banks   | purple   | £5m                  | 2 yrs      |
| Banks   | orange   | £5m                  | 1 yr       |
| Banks – part nationalised                                 | blue   | £5m                  | 1 yr       |
| Banks   | red  | £5m                  | 6 mths     |
| Banks   | green  | £5m                  | 100 days   |
| Banks   | No colour                                      | Not to be used       |            |
| Limit 3 category – Council's banker (not meeting Banks 1) | XXX  | 100 %                | 1 day      |
| DMADF   | AAA  | unlimited            | 6 months   |
| Local authorities   | n/a  | 100 %                | 1yrs       |
|   | Fund rating                                    | Money and/or % Limit | Time Limit |
| Money market funds  | AAA  | 100 %                | liquid     |
| Enhanced money market funds with a credit score of 1.25   | Dark pink / AAA                                | 100 %                | liquid     |
| Enhanced money market funds with a credit score of 1.5    | Light pink / AAA                               | 100 %                | liquid     |
|   |  |                      |            |

Our creditworthiness service uses a wider array of information than just primary ratings and by using a risk weighted scoring system, does not give undue preponderance to just one agency's ratings.

Typically the minimum credit ratings criteria the Council use will be a Short Term rating (Fitch or equivalents) of F1 and a Long Term rating of A-. There may be occasions when the counterparty ratings from one rating agency are marginally lower than these ratings but may still be used. In these instances consideration will be given to the whole range of ratings available, or other topical market information, to support their use.

All credit ratings will be monitored daily. The Council is alerted to changes to ratings of all three agencies through its use of our creditworthiness service.

- if a downgrade results in the counterparty / investment scheme no longer meeting the Council's minimum criteria, its further use as a new investment will be withdrawn immediately.
- in addition to the use of credit ratings the Council will be advised of information in movements in credit default swap spreads against the iTraxx benchmark and other market data on a weekly basis. Extreme market movements may result in downgrade of an institution or removal from the Council's lending list.

Sole reliance will not be placed on the use of this external service. In addition this Council will also use market data and market information, information on sovereign support for banks and the credit ratings of that supporting government.

#### **4.4 Country limits**

The Council has determined that it will only use approved counterparties other countries (where the approved counterparties from outside of the UK are from countries with a minimum sovereign credit rating of AAA from Fitch or equivalent). The list of countries that qualify using this credit criteria as at the date of this report are shown in Appendix 5.5. This list will be added to, or deducted from, by officers should ratings change in accordance with this policy.

#### **4.5 Investment strategy**

**In-house funds.** Investments will be made with reference to the core balance and cash flow requirements and the outlook for short-term interest rates (i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months).

**Investment returns expectations.** Bank Rate is forecast to remain unchanged at 0.5% before starting to rise from quarter 4 of 2015. Bank Rate forecasts for financial year ends (March) are:

- 2015/16 0.75%
- 2016/17 1.25%
- 2017/18 2.00%

There are downside risks to these forecasts (i.e. start of increases in Bank Rate occurs later) if economic growth weakens. However, should the pace of growth quicken, there could be an upside risk.

The suggested budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to 100 days during each financial year for the next eight years are as follows:

- 2015/16 0.60%
- 2016/17 1.25%
- 2017/18 1.75%
- 2018/19 2.25%
- 2019/20 2.75%
- 2020/21 3.00%
- 2021/22 3.25%
- 2022/23 3.25%
- Later years 3.50%

**Investment treasury indicator and limit** - total principal funds invested for greater than 364 days. These limits are set with regard to the Council's liquidity requirements and to reduce the need for early sale of an investment, and are based on the availability of funds after each year-end.

The Council is asked to approve the treasury indicator and limit: -

| <b>Maximum principal sums invested &gt; 364 days</b> |                |                |                |
|--|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| <b>£m</b>  | <b>2015/16</b> | <b>2016/17</b> | <b>2017/18</b> |
| Principal sums invested > 364 days                   | £m<br>Nil      | £m<br>Nil      | £m<br>Nil      |

#### **4.6 End of year investment report**

At the end of the financial year, the Council will report on its investment activity as part of its Annual Treasury Report.

## **5. APPENDICES**

1. Interest rate forecasts
2. Economic background
3. Treasury management practice 1 – credit and counterparty risk management
4. Approved countries for investments
5. Treasury management scheme of delegation
6. The treasury management role of the section 151 officer

## 5.1 APPENDIX: Interest Rate Forecasts 2015 – 2018

**PWLB rates and forecast shown below have taken into account the 20 basis point certainty rate reduction effective as of the 1st November 2012.**

| Capita Asset Services Interest Rate View   |         |        |        |        |         |        |        |        |         |        |        |        |         |
|--|---------|--------|--------|--------|---------|--------|--------|--------|---------|--------|--------|--------|---------|
|  | M ar-15 | Jun-15 | Sep-15 | Dec-15 | M ar-16 | Jun-16 | Sep-16 | Dec-16 | M ar-17 | Jun-17 | Sep-17 | Dec-17 | M ar-18 |
| Bank Rate View   | 0.50%   | 0.50%  | 0.50%  | 0.75%  | 0.75%   | 1.00%  | 1.00%  | 1.25%  | 1.25%   | 1.50%  | 1.75%  | 1.75%  | 2.00%   |
| 3 Month LIBID  | 0.50%   | 0.50%  | 0.60%  | 0.80%  | 0.90%   | 1.10%  | 1.10%  | 1.30%  | 1.40%   | 1.50%  | 1.80%  | 1.90%  | 2.10%   |
| 6 Month LIBID  | 0.70%   | 0.70%  | 0.80%  | 1.00%  | 1.10%   | 1.20%  | 1.30%  | 1.50%  | 1.60%   | 1.70%  | 2.00%  | 2.10%  | 2.30%   |
| 12 Month LIBID   | 0.90%   | 1.00%  | 1.10%  | 1.30%  | 1.40%   | 1.50%  | 1.60%  | 1.80%  | 1.90%   | 2.00%  | 2.30%  | 2.40%  | 2.60%   |
| 5yr PW IB Rate   | 2.20%   | 2.20%  | 2.30%  | 2.50%  | 2.60%   | 2.80%  | 2.90%  | 3.00%  | 3.20%   | 3.30%  | 3.40%  | 3.50%  | 3.60%   |
| 10yr PW IB Rate  | 2.80%   | 2.80%  | 3.00%  | 3.20%  | 3.30%   | 3.50%  | 3.60%  | 3.70%  | 3.80%   | 3.90%  | 4.00%  | 4.10%  | 4.20%   |
| 25yr PW IB Rate  | 3.40%   | 3.50%  | 3.70%  | 3.80%  | 4.00%   | 4.20%  | 4.30%  | 4.40%  | 4.50%   | 4.60%  | 4.70%  | 4.70%  | 4.80%   |
| 50yr PW IB Rate  | 3.40%   | 3.50%  | 3.70%  | 3.80%  | 4.00%   | 4.20%  | 4.30%  | 4.40%  | 4.50%   | 4.60%  | 4.70%  | 4.70%  | 4.80%   |
| Bank Rate  |         |        |        |        |         |        |        |        |         |        |        |        |         |
| Capita Asset Services  | 0.50%   | 0.50%  | 0.50%  | 0.75%  | 0.75%   | 1.00%  | 1.00%  | 1.25%  | 1.25%   | 1.50%  | 1.75%  | 1.75%  | 2.00%   |
| Capital Economics  | 0.50%   | 0.50%  | 0.75%  | 0.75%  | 1.00%   | 1.00%  | 1.25%  | 1.25%  | -       | -      | -      | -      | -       |
| 5yr PW IB Rate   |         |        |        |        |         |        |        |        |         |        |        |        |         |
| Capita Asset Services  | 2.20%   | 2.20%  | 2.30%  | 2.50%  | 2.60%   | 2.80%  | 2.90%  | 3.00%  | 3.20%   | 3.30%  | 3.40%  | 3.50%  | 3.60%   |
| Capital Economics  | 1.80%   | 2.05%  | 2.30%  | 2.55%  | 2.80%   | 2.80%  | 3.05%  | 3.05%  | -       | -      | -      | -      | -       |
| 10yr PW IB Rate  |         |        |        |        |         |        |        |        |         |        |        |        |         |
| Capita Asset Services  | 2.80%   | 2.80%  | 3.00%  | 3.20%  | 3.30%   | 3.50%  | 3.60%  | 3.70%  | 3.80%   | 3.90%  | 4.00%  | 4.10%  | 4.20%   |
| Capital Economics  | 2.30%   | 2.55%  | 2.55%  | 2.80%  | 3.05%   | 3.05%  | 3.30%  | 3.30%  | -       | -      | -      | -      | -       |
| 25yr PW IB Rate  |         |        |        |        |         |        |        |        |         |        |        |        |         |
| Capita Asset Services  | 3.40%   | 3.50%  | 3.70%  | 3.80%  | 4.00%   | 4.20%  | 4.30%  | 4.40%  | 4.50%   | 4.60%  | 4.70%  | 4.70%  | 4.80%   |
| Capital Economics  | 2.95%   | 3.15%  | 3.15%  | 3.50%  | 3.90%   | 3.90%  | 4.15%  | 4.15%  | -       | -      | -      | -      | -       |
| 50yr PW IB Rate  |         |        |        |        |         |        |        |        |         |        |        |        |         |
| Capita Asset Services  | 3.40%   | 3.50%  | 3.70%  | 3.80%  | 4.00%   | 4.20%  | 4.30%  | 4.40%  | 4.50%   | 4.60%  | 4.70%  | 4.70%  | 4.80%   |
| Capital Economics  | 3.10%   | 3.30%  | 3.30%  | 3.60%  | 4.00%   | 4.00%  | 4.30%  | 4.30%  | -       | -      | -      | -      | -       |
| Please note – The current PWLIB rates and forecast shown above have taken into account the 20 basis point certainty rate reduction effective as of the 1st November 2012 |         |        |        |        |         |        |        |        |         |        |        |        |         |



## 5.2 APPENDIX: Economic Background

**UK.** After strong UK GDP growth in 2013 at an annual rate of 2.7%, and then growth in 2014 of 0.6% in Q1, 0.8% Q2, 0.7% Q3 and 0.5% Q4 (annual rate for 2014 of 2.6%), there are good grounds for optimism that growth could pick back up again during 2015 after cooling towards the end of 2014, as the positive effects from the fall in the price of oil feeds through to consumers and other parts of the economy. For this recovery to become more balanced and sustainable in the longer term, the recovery needs to move away from dependence on consumer expenditure and the housing market to exporting, and particularly of manufactured goods, both of which need to substantially improve on their recent lacklustre performance. This overall strong growth has resulted in unemployment falling much faster than expected. The MPC is not expected to take any action for at least the first half of 2015 as inflation could even turn negative in this period. However, even if oil was to remain at around the \$50-60 per barrel price throughout all of 2015, the positive effect of the initial drop in price during Q4 2014 will fall out of the twelve month calculation of CPI towards the end of the year, leaving inflation vulnerable to a sharp jump upwards. The MPC will also be keeping alert as to how quickly slack in the economy is being used up, especially as unemployment continues to fall. It will also be monitoring how strong a stimulative effect the drop in oil prices has on the economy as falling inflation will be comfortably exceeded by wage increases meaning that the disposable incomes of consumers will recover strongly during 2015. One continuing area of weakness in the UK economy is the need for a major improvement in labour productivity, which has languished at dismal levels since 2008, to support increases in pay rates after the positive effect of the fall in oil prices dissipates. Unemployment is expected to keep on its downward trend and this is likely to feed through into a return to significant increases in wage growth at some point during the next few years. However, just how much those increases in pay rates will counteract the dampening effect of stepped increases in Bank Rate, albeit at a slow rate, on consumer confidence, consumer expenditure and the buoyancy of the housing market, is open to conjecture.

Also encouraging has been the sharp fall in inflation (CPI), reaching 1.0% in November 2014 and then halving to 0.5% in December, the lowest rate since May 2000. Forward indications are that inflation could turn negative during the earlier part of 2015; however, the MPC is focused on where inflation will be over a 2 – 3 year time horizon so too much emphasis should not be placed on the short term outlook in terms of the risks around when Bank Rate is likely to start increasing. The return to strong growth has helped lower forecasts for the increase in Government debt over the last year but monthly public sector deficit figures during 2014 have disappointed, being only a fraction lower than the previous year through to December 2014. The autumn statement, therefore, had to revise the speed with which the deficit is forecast to be eliminated. The flight to quality in January 2015 has seen gilt yields fall to incredibly low levels, reducing interest costs on new and replacement government debt.

**Eurozone (EZ).** The Eurozone is facing an increasing threat from weak or negative growth and from deflation. In January 2015, the inflation rate fell further, to reach a low of -0.6%. However, this is an average for all EZ countries and includes some countries with even higher negative rates of inflation. Initially, the ECB took some rather limited action in June and September 2014 to loosen monetary policy in order to promote growth. As this failed to have much of a discernible effect, the ECB launched a massive €1.1 trillion programme of quantitative easing in January 2015 to buy up high credit quality government debt of selected EZ countries. This programme will run to September 2016.

Concern in financial markets for the Eurozone had subsided considerably after the prolonged crisis during 2011-2013. However, sovereign debt difficulties have not gone away and major issues could return in respect of any countries that do not dynamically address issues of low growth, international uncompetitiveness and the need for overdue reforms of the economy, (as Ireland has done). It is, therefore, possible over the next few years that levels of government debt to GDP ratios could continue to rise for some countries. This could mean that sovereign debt concerns have not disappeared but, rather, have only been postponed. The ECB's pledge in 2012 to buy unlimited amounts of bonds of countries which ask for a bailout has provided heavily indebted countries with a strong defence against market forces. This has bought them time to make progress with their economies to return to growth or to reduce the degree of recession. However, debt to GDP ratios (2013 figures) of Greece 180%, Italy 133%, Portugal 129%, Ireland 124% and Cyprus 112%, remain a cause for concern, especially as some of these countries are experiencing continuing rates of increase in debt in excess of their rate of economic growth i.e. these debt ratios are likely to continue to deteriorate. Any sharp downturn in economic growth would make these countries particularly vulnerable to a new bout of sovereign debt crisis. It should also be noted that Italy has the third biggest debt mountain in the world behind Japan and the US.

**Greece:** the general election on 25 January 2015 has brought to power a coalition which is anti EU imposed austerity. Although it is not certain that Greece will leave the Euro, the recent intractability of the troika (the EU, ECB and IMF), to finding a negotiated compromise with the new Greek government leaves this as a real possibility. However, if Greece was to leave the EZ, it is unlikely that this will directly destabilise the Eurozone as the EU has put in place adequate firewalls to contain the immediate fallout to just Greece. Nevertheless, the indirect effects of the likely strengthening of anti EU and anti austerity political parties throughout the EU is much more difficult to gauge. There are particular concerns as to whether democratically elected governments will lose the support of electorates suffering under EZ imposed austerity programmes, especially in countries which have high unemployment rates. Of particular concern is the fact that Spain and Portugal have general elections coming up in late 2015. This will give ample opportunity for anti austerity parties to make a big impact.

There are also major concerns as to whether the governments of France and Italy will effectively implement austerity programmes and undertake overdue reforms to improve national competitiveness. These countries already have political parties with major electoral support for anti EU and anti austerity policies. Any loss of market confidence in either of the two largest Eurozone economies, after Germany, would present a huge challenge to the resources of the ECB to defend their debt.

**USA.** The U.S. Federal Reserve ended its monthly asset purchases in October 2014. GDP growth rates (annualised) for Q2 of 4.6%, Q3 of 5.0% and Q4 of 2.6%, (overall 2.4% during 2014 as a whole), provides great promise for strong growth going forward. It is confidently forecast that the first increase in the Fed. rate will occur by the end of 2015.

**China.** Government action in 2014 to stimulate the economy almost succeeded in achieving the target of 7.5% growth but recent government statements have emphasised that growth going forward will slow marginally as this becomes the new normal for China. There are concerns that the Chinese leadership has only just started to address an unbalanced economy, which is heavily over dependent on new investment expenditure, and for a potential bubble in the property sector to burst, as it

did in Japan in the 1990s, with its consequent impact on the financial health of the banking sector. There are also concerns around the potential size, and dubious creditworthiness, of some bank lending to local government organisations and major corporates. This primarily occurred during the government promoted expansion of credit, which was aimed at protecting the overall rate of growth in the economy after the Lehmans crisis.

**Japan.** Japan is causing considerable concern as the increase in sales tax in April 2014 has suppressed consumer expenditure and growth to the extent that it has slipped back into recession. The Japanese government already has the highest debt to GDP ratio in the world.

## **CAPITA ASSET SERVICES FORWARD VIEW**

Economic forecasting remains difficult with so many external influences weighing on the UK. Our Bank Rate forecasts, (and also MPC decisions), will be liable to further amendment depending on how economic data transpires over 2015. Forecasts for average earnings beyond the three year time horizon will be heavily dependent on economic and political developments. Major volatility in bond yields is likely to endure as investor fears and confidence ebb and flow between favouring more risky assets i.e. equities, or the safe haven of bonds.

The overall longer run trend is for gilt yields and PWLB rates to rise, due to the high volume of gilt issuance in the UK, and of bond issuance in other major western countries. Increasing investor confidence in eventual world economic recovery is also likely to compound this effect as recovery will encourage investors to switch from bonds to equities.

The overall balance of risks to economic recovery in the UK is currently evenly balanced. Only time will tell just how long this current period of strong economic growth will last; it also remains exposed to vulnerabilities in a number of key areas.

The interest rate forecasts in this report are based on an initial assumption that there will not be a major resurgence of the EZ debt crisis. There is an increased risk that Greece could end up leaving the Euro but if this happens, the EZ now has sufficient fire walls in place that a Greek exit would have little immediate direct impact on the rest of the EZ and the Euro. It is therefore expected that there will be an overall managed, albeit painful and tortuous, resolution of any EZ debt crisis that may occur where EZ institutions and governments eventually do what is necessary - but only when all else has been tried and failed. Under this assumed scenario, growth within the EZ will be weak at best for the next couple of years with some EZ countries experiencing low or negative growth, which will, over that time period, see an increase in total government debt to GDP ratios. There is a significant danger that these ratios could rise to the point where markets lose confidence in the financial viability of one, or more, countries, especially if growth disappoints and / or efforts to reduce government deficits fail to deliver the necessary reductions. However, it is impossible to forecast whether any individual country will lose such confidence, or when, and so precipitate a sharp resurgence of the EZ debt crisis. While the ECB has adequate resources to manage a debt crisis in a small EZ country, if one, or more, of the larger countries were to experience a major crisis of market confidence, this would present a serious challenge to the ECB and to EZ politicians.

Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:

- Geopolitical risks in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Asia, increasing safe haven flows.
- UK strong economic growth is weaker than we currently anticipate.
- Weak growth or recession in the UK's main trading partners - the EU, US and China.
- A resurgence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.
- Recapitalisation of European banks requiring more government financial support.
- Monetary policy action failing to stimulate sustainable growth and to combat the threat of deflation in western economies, especially the Eurozone and Japan.

The potential for upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates, especially for longer term PWLB rates include:-

- An adverse reaction by financial markets to the result of the UK general election in May 2015 and the economic and debt management policies adopted by the new government.
- The ECB severely disappointing financial markets with a programme of asset purchases which proves insufficient to significantly stimulate growth in the EZ.
- The commencement by the US Federal Reserve of increases in the Fed. funds rate in 2015, causing a fundamental reassessment by investors of the relative risks of holding bonds as opposed to equities and leading to a major flight from bonds to equities.
- UK inflation returning to significantly higher levels than in the wider EU and US, causing an increase in the inflation premium inherent to gilt yields.

### 5.3 APPENDIX: Treasury Management Practice (TMP1) – Credit and Counterparty Risk Management

**SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS:** All such investments will be sterling denominated, with **maturities up to maximum of 1 year**, meeting the minimum ‘high’ quality criteria where applicable.

**NON-SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS:** These are any investments which do not meet the specified investment criteria. A maximum of 50% \*\* will be held in aggregate in non-specified investment

A variety of investment instruments will be used, subject to the credit quality of the institution, and depending on the type of investment made it will fall into one of the above categories.

The criteria, time limits and monetary limits applying to institutions or investment vehicles are:

|   | Minimum credit criteria / colour band              | ** Max % of total investments/ £ limit per institution | Max. maturity period  |
|---|--|--|---|
| <b>DMADF – UK Government</b>                            | N/A  | <b>100%</b>  | <b>6 months</b>   |
| UK Government gilts                                     | UK sovereign rating                                | 50%  | 5 years   |
| UK Government Treasury blls                             | UK sovereign rating                                | 50%  | 5 years   |
| Bonds issued by multilateral development banks          | AAA (or state your criteria if different)          | 50%  | 6 months  |
| Money market funds                                      | AAA  | 100%   | Liquid  |
| Enhanced money market funds with a credit score of 1.25 | AAA  | 100%   | Liquid  |
| Enhanced money market funds with a credit score of 1.5  | AAA  | 100%   | Liquid  |
| Local authorities                                       | N/A  | 100%   | 1 years   |
| Term deposits with banks and building societies         | Yellow<br>Purple<br>Blue<br>Orange<br>Red<br>Green | £5M<br>£5M<br>£5M<br>£5M<br>£5M<br>0                   | Up to 5 years<br>Up to 2 years<br>Up to 1 year<br>Up to 1 year<br>Up to 6<br>Months |

|  |   |                            |   |
|--|---|----------------------------|---|
|  | No Colour   |                            | Up to 100 days<br>Not for use   |
| CDs or corporate bonds with banks and building societies | Yellow<br>Purple<br>Blue<br>Orange<br>Red<br>Green<br>No Colour | 0<br>0<br>0<br>0<br>0<br>0 | Up to 5 years<br>Up to 2 years<br>Up to 1 year<br>Up to 1 year<br>Up to 6 Months<br>Up to 100 days<br>Not for use |
| Corporate bond funds                                     |   | Nil                        |   |
| Gilt funds   | UK sovereign rating   | Nil                        |   |
| Property funds   |   | Nil                        |   |

## 5.4 APPENDIX: Approved countries for investments

*Based on lowest available rating*

### AAA

- Australia
- Canada
- Denmark
- Germany
- Luxembourg
- Norway
- Singapore
- Sweden
- Switzerland

### AA+

- Finland
- Hong Kong
- Netherlands
- U.K.
- U.S.A.

### AA

- Abu Dhabi (UAE)
- France
- Qatar

### AA-

- Belgium
- Saudi Arabia

## **5.5 APPENDIX: Treasury management scheme of delegation**

### **(i) Council**

- receiving and reviewing reports on treasury management policies, practices and activities;
- approval of annual strategy.

### **(ii) Committees/Council**

- approval of/amendments to the organisation's adopted clauses, treasury management policy statement and treasury management practices;
- budget consideration and approval;
- approval of the division of responsibilities;
- receiving and reviewing regular monitoring reports and acting on recommendations;
- approving the selection of external service providers and agreeing terms of appointment.

### **(iii) Person(s) with responsibility for scrutiny**

- reviewing the treasury management policy and procedures and making recommendations to the responsible body.



## **5.6 APPENDIX: The treasury management role of the section 151 officer**

### **The S151 (responsible) officer**

- recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance;
- submitting regular treasury management policy reports;
- submitting budgets and budget variations;
- receiving and reviewing management information reports;
- reviewing the performance of the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit;
- recommending the appointment of external service providers.